Supposing that an angel is such, is it composed of matter and form. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Objection 2. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a general knowledge. 1. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones. This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted above (I:47:1). Reply to Objection 3. Objection 4. Reply to Objection 2. Objection 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. Further, form is act. Therefore the angels are not of the same species. Therefore there are many angels of one species. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal things. To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Ogni anghjulu chì Diu hà creatu hè un essere unicu, dice San Tomas d'Aquinu in u so libru "Summa Theologica:" "Siccomu l'ànghjuli ùn anu nunda è custruiscenu in elli, postu ch'elli sò spiriti puri, ùn sò micca identificati. ii) that "the angel knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth.". The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species. On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as "first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph. Articulus I. Utrum tempus resurrectionis oporteat differri usque ad finem … It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species. As was observed above (I:44:1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Sed nullum singulare est intelligibile. Supplementum Tertiae Partis _____ Poenitentia (Q. I - XXVIII) Quaestio I. So in every one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures. Objection 2: Further, it is stated in De Causis that "every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances. Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam, cessat obiectio, quia una et continua et sempiterna operatione … 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nec in Angelo nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia operativa est … And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. A CURIOUS QUSTIONS INDEED. ii, 3) that he is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature." Aquinas freed people from troubled thoughts when they harm animals. The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. But this is impossible. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because "the species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. Reply to Objection 3. But this is clearly false. Reply to Objection 1. Reply to Objection 4. From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects. Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel understood, since each is immaterial. Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above (Q[12], A[4]). 2 Praeterea, ultima differentia specifica est nobilissima, quia complet rationem speciei. Ergo plures angeli possunt esse in uno loco. I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. While aiming to clarify the meaning of a fragment from Summa Theologica, IIa IIae, q. Reply to Objection 2. viii, text 10). He was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (Article 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Il culto di San Michele in Castel S. Angelo: Note sulla Mole Adriana nel medioevo. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Further, according to Gregory (Moral. For Dionysius says (Div. Oportet … Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance. Reply to Objection 3. Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. Reply to Objection 2. 16) that "intelligence is finite from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is "infinite from below," as not received in any matter. More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Sed homines aliqui cognoscunt multa futura. lit. Angel. iii). But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter. 2. i, 7): "Every creature is limited within its own nature." Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation. As was observed above (I:44:1) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Article 3. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because "the species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. But an angel is in the genus of substance. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. Reply to Objection 1. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. It is difference which constitutes the species. Objection 4. Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it." Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. Reply to Objection 4. 75 a. A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. prima pars secundae partis a quaestione I ad quaestionem V. Textum Leoninum Romae 1891 editum et automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit ... quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. Reply to Objection 1. On the contrary, It is said (Daniel 7:10): "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him." Hier., quod Angeli dividuntur in substantiam, virtutem et operationem. De bonitate Dei. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (Article 2), it cannot lose its being. To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.". VII: Ad secundum dicendum, quod duae operationes possunt simul esse unius potentiae, quarum una ad aliam refertur; . But this is clearly false. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. In Paradisum deducant te Angeli ; May the Angels lead you into Paradise; in tuo adventu suscipiant te Martyresin your coming, may the martyrs receive you, et perducant te in civitatem sanctam Jerusalem and guide pradisum into the holy city Jerusalem Chorus Angelorum te suscipiatMay the Choirs of Angels receive you, et cum Laza ro quondam paupereand with the once poor Lazarus, aeternam … Therefore an angel does not know his own essence. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation. But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Et ideo post vesperam non ponitur nox, sed mane: ita quod mane sit finis praecedentis diei et principium sequentis, inquantum angeli cognitionem praecedentis operis ad laudem Dei referunt. Objection 4. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it.
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